NB/T 20063-2012 English PDF (NBT20063-2012)

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NB/T 20063-2012: Glossary of terms of instrumentation and control for nuclear power plants
NB/T 20063-2012
ENERGY INDUSTRY STANDARD OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ICS 27.120.01
F 80
Filing number: 35988-2012
Glossary of terms of instrumentation and control for
nuclear power plants
ISSUED ON: JANUARY 06, 2012
IMPLEMENTED ON: APRIL 06, 2012
Issued by: National Energy Administration
Table of Contents
Foreword ... 3 
1 Scope ... 4 
2 Basic concepts ... 4 
3 Instrumentation control systems and device ... 18 
4 Computer applications ... 36 
5 Man-machine interface ... 41 
6 Qualification ... 46 
7 Test and maintenance ... 57 
References ... 67 
English index ... 71 
Glossary of terms of instrumentation and control for
nuclear power plants
1 Scope
This standard specifies common terms and definitions related to
instrumentation and control (I and C) for nuclear power plants and their power
sources.
This standard applies to applications for nuclear power plant; other nuclear
facilities can be used with reference to it.
2 Basic concepts
2.1
Operational states
A collective name for two types of states, normal operation and anticipated
operational occurrences.
[HAF 102 (2004)]
2.2
Normal operation
The operation of nuclear power plants within specified operating limits and
conditions.
[HAF 102 (2004)]
2.3
Design basis
Information that determines the value, or range of parameters, of a structure,
system, component, or device that performs a specific function and is a
design boundary. This information can be either limits (derived from
generally accepted practices to achieve a functional goal), or some
requirements [derived from operational analysis of the assumed events
wherein the structures, systems, components shall meet their functional
Accident conditions with severity exceeding design basis accidents.
Note: Certain beyond design basis accidents do not cause significant
degradation of core performance.
[IAEA Safety Glossary: 2007]
2.9
Accident conditions
Working conditions which are more severe than anticipated operational
events, including design basis accidents and severe accidents.
[HAF 102 (2004)]
2.10
Severe accident
Accident conditions with a severity that exceeds the design basis accident
and causes a significant deterioration of the reactor core.
[HAF 102 (2004)]
2.11
Accident management
A series of actions taken during the development of beyond design basis
accidents:
a) In order to prevent the accident that the core is not severely damaged
from escalating to a severe accident;
b) In order to mitigate the consequences of severe accidents;
c) In order to achieve a long-term stable state of safety.
Note: Rewrite the definition of HAF 102 (2004).
2.12
Station blackout
In the nuclear power plant, all the AC power supply to the buses of important
and non-important power distribution devices is lost, that is, the off-site
power is lost, the turbine is tripped and the emergency AC power supply in
the station is faulty, but the AC power or alternative AC power as fed from
[GB/T 4960.6-2008, definition 4.3.8]
2.26
Trip setpoint
A predetermined set value for triggering an action.
Note: Rewrite IEC 61888:2002, definition 3.22.
2.27
Safety class
A safety class for electrical device and systems in nuclear power plants,
which are necessary to complete emergency shutdown of the reactor,
containment isolation, core cooling, exhaust heat from the containment and
reactor, or to prevent large amounts of radioactive material from being
discharged to the environment .
Note 1: Safety class (Class 1E) is a functional term. Devices and systems
can only be classified as safety class if they complete the functions listed in
this part; systems or devices shall not be classified as safety class based on
other functions.
Note 2: Rewrite GB/T 13284.1-2008, definition 3.7.
2.28
Safety action
A single action taken by a safety drive system.
[GB/T 4960.6-2008, definition 4.4.7]
2.29
Safety measures
Any action that may be taken to achieve the basic requirements of the safety
requirements, any conditions that may be imposed, or any procedures that
may be followed.
[IAEA Safety Glossary: 2007]
2.30
Protective task
hardware aging and degradation) or system faults (such as software faults)
caused by design errors.
Note 2: A fault (especially a design fault) in the system may not be
discovered until certain conditions occur (that is, the result does not meet
the expected function, that is, a failure occurs).
Note 3: See "Software failure".
[NB/T 20026-2010, definition 3.22]
2.35
Fail-safe
A design principle that causes the system to tend to increase safety action
when any component in the system fails.
[GB/T 4960.6-2008, definition 4.1.16]
2.36
Detectable failures
Failures that can be identified through periodic tests, or failures discovered
through alarms or abnormal displays. Component failures detected at the
channel, sequence, or system level are all detectable failures.
Note: The failures that can be discriminated but not detectable are failures
that are judged through analysis. Such failures can neither be discovered
through periodic tests, nor can they be discovered through alarms or
abnormal displays.
[GB/T 13284.1-2008, definition 3.11]
2.37
Failure mode
The manner or state in which a structure, system, or component has failed.
[IAEA Safety Glossary: 2007]
2.38
Common mode failure
Failure of two or more structures, systems, or components caused by a
single event or cause in the same manner or mode.
safety, they can be classified as "not categorized".
Note 1: GB/T 15474 defines the categories of the I and C functions and related
systems and device (FSE). Each category corresponds to a set of
requirements. These requirements apply to I and C functions (including their
specifications, design, implementation, verification, confirmation), it is also
applicable to all items necessary for the realization of functions (involving
characteristics and related quality assessment), regardless of how these
items are distributed and interconnected in the I and C system. For the sake of
clarity, this standard defines the categories of I and C functions and the levels
of I and C systems, meanwhile specifies the relationship between the functional
categories and the minimum levels required by the relevant systems and
device.
Note 2: Rewrite NB/T 20026-2010, definition 3.4.
2.54
A category of an I and C function
Functions that play a major role in achieving or maintaining nuclear power
plant’s safety to prevent DBE from causing unacceptable consequences.
Note: A category functions also include those whose failures can directly
cause accident conditions if it cannot be mitigated by other A category
functions.
2.55
B category of an I and C function
Playing the function of supplementing the A category function to achieve or
maintain the safety of nuclear power plant, especially functions required to
operate after reaching a controlled state, in order to prevent DBE from
causing unacceptable consequences or mitigating the effects of DBE.
Note: B category also includes those functions whose failure may cause or
worsen DBE. Because A category functions can ultimately prevent or
mitigate the consequences of DBE, the safety requirements for B category
functions do not have to reach the height of A category fun...